Justifying Atomism. Nominalism, Anti-Realism, and Empirical Adequacy in Gassendi’s Philosophy of Science

In the dissertation, Juliane Küppers argues that the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) justifies his atomist hypothesis with its empirical adequacy. She shows that he, as a self-avowed nominalist, employs anti-realist notions about unobservable objects which he develops through his reception of ancient scepticism. He does so in order to propose, on a strictly empirical basis and without claim to certainty, that an updated Epicurean atomism is a natural philosophy that can provide answers for scientific questions of the 17th century. The dissertation thus focuses on the early modern reception of ancient theories in natural philosophy and epistemology; and on how the adoption and transformation of ancient theories led to progressive and influential notions about what scientific hypotheses actually are.